Docket No.:   SOM9-2003-0007US1

APPLICATION FOR UNITED STATES PATENT

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To all whom it may concern:

    Be it known that we, Michael G. Lisanke and David (NMI) Medina, citizens of United

25   States residing in Florida, have invented new and useful improvements in

Method and System for Diagnosing Operation of Tamper-Resistant Software

of which the following is a SPECIFICATION:

METHOD AND SYSTEM FOR DIAGNOSING OPERATION OF TAMPER-

RESISTANT SOFTWARE

The present invention is related to the following documents, all of which are assigned to

the assignee of the present invention and which are hereby specifically incorporated herein by

5   reference:

United States Patent 6,226,618 entitled "Electronic Content Delivery System" issued

May 1, 2001 to Edgar Downs et al., which patent describes a digital rights management system

for electronic delivery and protection of digital information and is therefore sometimes referred

to herein as the DRM Patent.

10   Patent application S.N. 10/437,692 (Docket SOM920030001) filed May 14, 2003 by

Michael G. Lisanke and entitled "Digital Content Control Including Digital Rights Management

(DRM) Through Dynamic Instrumentation", sometimes referred to herein as the Instrumentation

Patent.

Background of the Invention

Field of the Invention

5   The present invention relates to an improved method and system which allows for the

diagnosis or analysis of operation of software within a data processing system which includes a

protected operating environment, an environment which is sometimes referred to as a "tamper-

resistant" environment or a so-called "protected" processing environment. That is, the present

invention allows for analysis of software operation despite the environment having been

10   designed to prevent ordinary tools such as debuggers or tracing tools which could allow for

indication of the operation of the software (and without impacting the normal protection of such

environment). Preventing or discouraging use of such tools is desirable to protect content and

rights in a digital rights management system, for example.

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Background Art

Many prior art systems exist which deliver content to a processing environment where it is both protected and rendered, e.g., through the use of hardware and/or software of a user's

5   system. Such systems, in general, either do not protect the software and the content being handled from improper analysis or totally prevent diagnosis of operational problems with software by precluding analysis of the software. That is, digital rights management systems such as are shown in the DRM patent rely on the processing environment being protected from tampering or snooping by preventing or restrict the attachment of tracing software and other

10   debugging software. By preventing the attachment of such software, the DRM software makes the system more secure and is sometimes referred to as tamper-resistant environment software or a protected processing environment . In a system such as a DRM system, it is desirable to provide such tamper resistance to protect data used by the system (such as usage rights and secure content) from being observed and/or altered during the data processing of the system, to

15   make it more difficult for the protection of the digital rights management system to be overcome or the content to be obtained without protection.

While the normal operation of a protected data processing system or environment implies that it is unnecessary for any watching of the operation of the software or to trace or debug software, there are situations where the ability to watch the program operation would be

20   desirable. For example, during development and test, it is desirable to know what the program is doing (the steps that are being executed and the results of tests) to make sure the operation is normal and according to specifications. Later, during operation of the program at a user's environment, an apparent abnormality or bug may appear and it would be desirable to know the

context of the abnormality -- what was the program doing and which part of it was acting improperly. A typical DRM would have a variety of internal different components which could be at fault, ranging from a corruption in the executable code, an incorrect decryption key, incorrect rights or altered content, any one of which could lead to improper execution of a DRM

5   of the type described in the DRM Patent. In addition, a digital rights management system may be loaded on a processing system in which a variety of other programs are resident and may be operating in parallel, causing some possibility of corruption of the system.

Of course, it is possible to design the system with the "tamper-resistance" which is capable of being turned "on" and "off" as desired, in a variety of ways. That is, if situations

10 where it is desirable to watch the program operation, the tamper-resistance features could be temporarily turned "off", or disabled, to allow for monitoring of the operations, either manually by an operator or automatically in response to an anomaly such as an error message. Such a "switch" has the undesirable effect, however, of providing a circumvention method to permit the very tampering which the tamper resistance is designed to prevent and undermine the security of

15 the tamper-resistant environment..

The Instrumentation Patent describes a situation where dynamic instrumentation is permitted in a digital rights management system, and such a system might be used to provide information about the operation of software to permit debugging or analysis of the operation of the software. However, such an instrumentation system may have undesirable effects of reducing

20 the security of the system by allowing instrumentation to provide information on the operation of the digital rights management system to unauthorized personnel and reduce the security of the system.

Thus, the prior art systems have undesirable disadvantages or limitations, and those undesirable limitations either restrict the ability to determine the operation of the system or allow possible attacks of the system, neither of which is desirable.

Summary of the Invention

The present invention overcomes the disadvantages and limitations of the prior art

systems by providing a simple, yet effective, way of providing a protected operating

environment while allowing for capture of information for diagnosis or analysis of program

5   operation to discern problems with the software.

The present system also has the advantage of avoiding (or minimizing the risk of)

compromising the security of the system that includes the tamper resistance built into that

system, through either hardware or software which accomplishes the tamper resistance.

The present invention has the advantage that the operation of software within a protected

10   processing environment may be reviewed and errors detected and corrected.

This error detection and correction may occur without disabling or otherwise removing or

circumventing the protection of the protected processing environment. This is desirable since the

protected processing environment may be a source of the problem and removing it would change

the operating system and possibly remove the source of the errors.

15   One optional feature of the present invention has the further benefit that the results of

monitoring may be selectively engaged, when a problem has occurred or is possible to occur In

this way the program which records the processing takes system resources only when diagnostic

information is desired and may be turned "off" or disengaged when no monitoring is needed. In

this way, the processing of the diagnostic routines do not require processing steps when there is

20   no need for the monitoring.

Another optional feature of the present invention is that the system creates a trace log which is encrypted (preferably as each entry in the log is created) and of fixed size (either relatively or in absolute terms) to protect it from monitoring and the system as a whole from attack. That is, the trace log is file of a fixed size, and the fixed size reduces the chance that its

5   role as a trace log will be apparent from a monitoring of the log and that the events being monitored will be apparent to an attacker, making the trace log and the system as a whole harder to attack. The encryption prevents the contents of the file (trace log) from being read without a decryption key.

The present invention may be operated by "turning on" a trace operation when a log is

10   desired, then recording the inputs and outputs of the system on each activity in a trace log that is encrypted as it is created. The recorded trace log is then sent to a central location where the decryption key is present and the activities in the trace log are decrypted, then analyzed to determine whether each is proper and determining if there was an anomaly and what caused the anomaly.

15   The present invention also has the advantage that the times of message logging, the amounts of data logged and the content of messages logged are all obscured from the user of the system on which the logging is done. This has the advantage that the user may know that the system has a logging function, but it is more difficult for the user to find the logging and to determine what is being logged. Further, the messages are obscured by encryption to make the

20   content of the logged messages unintelligible without a decrypting key.

The present invention includes a secure logger package which provides a secure keypair build utility, a secure logger function, a secure logging user run-time utility function and a secure logfile view support runtime utility. The secure keypair build facility generates a keypair (a private key and a public key), where the public key is then hashed and the public key and the

5   hash are then written into the header of the source code for the product. The secure logger function then uses the public key to encrypt a symmetric key which symmetric key is used to encrypt the messages.

The secure logger package presents software that makes it difficult to determine what is being logged, when it is logged, and the relationship of the logging to any protected DRM

10   actions taken by the tamper-resistant software. The preferred method of operation involves the log being copied and delivered to a remote and trusted processor where the keys are determined and the contents of the trace log decrypted so that notable events from recent operation of the securing processing system can be recovered, leading to information about the operation of the secure processing system.

15   Other objects and advantages of the system and method of the present invention will be apparent to those skilled in the art in view of the detailed description of the preferred embodiment and the discussion that follows.

Brief Description of the Drawings

Having thus set forth some of the limitations and disadvantages of the prior art and some objects and advantages of the present invention, other objects and advantages will be apparent to those skilled in the relevant art in view of the following description of the drawings illustrating the present invention of an improved routing system and method in which:

Fig. 1 is a block diagram for a digital rights management system, an understanding of which is useful for the understanding of the present invention;

Fig. 2 is a block diagram of a secure logging software package of the present invention that is useful in connection with the digital rights management system of Fig. 1;

Fig. 3 is a logical flow diagram of key processing, the first element of the secure logging facility shown in Fig. 2;

Fig. 4 is a logical flow diagram of the logger initializer, the second element of the secure logging facility shown in Fig. 2;

Fig. 5 is a logical flow diagram of the logger runtime, the third element of the secure logging facility shown in Fig. 2;

Fig. 6 is a logical flow diagram of the logfile viewer function, the fourth element of the secure logging facility shown in Fig. 2;

Fig. 7a is a chart depicting one embodiment of the output of the secure logging function (a trace log) as it is first created;

Fig. 7b is a chart depicting the trace log of Fig. 7a after several transactions have been included in it;

Fig. 7c is a chart depicting the trace log of Fig. 7b after a number of transactions have

been recorded it in, causing the storage to "wrap around" and begin filling from the top again;

and

Fig. 8 is a flow chart of the process of operating the secure logging function in the

5   context of a digital rights management system of the present invention shown in Fig. 1.

Detailed Description of the Preferred Embodiment

In the following description of the preferred embodiment, the best implementations of practicing the invention presently known to the inventors will be described with some

5 particularity. However, this description is intended as a broad, general teaching of the concepts of the present invention in a specific embodiment but is not intended to be limiting the present invention to that as shown in this embodiment, especially since those skilled in the relevant art will recognize many variations and changes to the specific structure and operation shown and described with respect to these figures.

10 Fig. 1 shows a block diagram of a system in which a digital rights management system is functioning. As shown in this view, a client 10 includes a digital rights management (DRM) system 12 and a rendering system (or device) 14 along with a protected processing environment 16 that is indicated through the use of a dotted line. The client 10 may be a specialized device or may be a general-purpose data processing device such as a personal computer, such as an IBM

15 ThinkPad. The digital rights management system includes a portion of code running in the client 10 to receive protected digital content along with additional information such as keys and permissions as described in the above-identified DRM Patent. When a user at the client 10 desires to use some of the digital content (which content might be audio content such as music, audiovisual material such as a movie, or visual content such as electronic books, or some

20 combination of these types of materials) which are stored on his machine, he uses his DRM system 12 to identify the material desired. The DRM system then determines whether the identified content is subject to usage conditions (such as types of usage, duration of usage, number of uses, etc.) and whether the usage conditions are met (that is, if the content is subject

to use for only a finite period of time, determining whether the present time is within the finite time period). If the usage is permitted by the usage conditions that are associated with the material provided, then the content is rendered through the rendering system 14 of the user's system. The rendering system, of course, depends on the type of content which is being used, and might include speakers for audio content and a display or other visual output device (like a television) for video content such as movie or electronic book). The processing of the digital rights management system and the rendering occurs within the protected processing environment 16 to protect the content for snooping or spoofing to obtain the content in the clear.

Figure 1 also illustrates other components of a digital rights management system to illustrate the preparation and processing of content from a source through its distribution to a user. In the form illustrated, content originates with a content owner or creator 20 who uses content preparation software at a content preparation workstation 22 to prepare his content for use in a digital rights management and distribution system. Once the content has been prepared in a suitable digital format and appropriate information regarding usage has been attached to the content, the content is send to a content hosting site 24. Also, information about the content and the content hosting site is sent to a retailer or electronic "store" 26 as well as a clearinghouse 28. The retailer or electronic store 26 maintains a listing of the materials that are available and the terms under which the materials are available. The clearinghouse 28 receives information about a purchase of content and provides the business aspects of the transaction, namely collection of the revenue through a charge card, account debit or other payment device, accounting for the transaction and providing a history log of the transactions for subsequent accounting and auditing as well as confirmation of transactions with users.

Although Fig.. 1 depicts only one client 10, one content prep site 22, one content host 24, one retailer 26 and one clearinghouse 28, a content distribution system could have any number of each included within its domain. That is, any number of clients like the client 10 could exist and any number of content hosts like the content host 24 could exist within the network, as desired.

5   Also, the system could include any number of retailers like the retailer 26, and those retailers could include overlapping selections of content available to users. Any number of clearinghouses like the clearinghouse 28 could also exist, although each retailer might be associated with only one of the clearinghouses. Further, some of the functions could be combined into a single entity. For example, the content prep and content host function could be combined and handled by a

10   single entity. Also, the content host function and the retailer or "store: function could be combined, to allow a retailer to take an order and fulfill it. Further, the function of a clearinghouse could be combined with the retailer function or with the content host function, if desired.

The content prep operation, the content host operation, the retailer and the clearinghouse

15   each may process information in a protected processing environment, if these systems are untrusted and/or there is a need for security of the data, like the protection provided in a secure or protected processing environment. If these sites are secure or protected from observation by software like debugging tools, then they may have use for a system of the present invention for debugging the operation of the software operating within a protected processing environment.

20   Fig. 2 illustrates the several functions of a secure logging software package 70 of the present invention. The secure logging software package 70 includes a key processing module 72, a logger initializer module 74, a logger runtime module 76 and a logfile viewer 78.

The operation of the key processing module 72 is illustrated in Fig. 3. First, at block 82, keys are generated for each product build, uniquely associating a security log library with a secure logfile viewer. The public key is hashed at block 84. The public key and the hash are written to the public header file at block 86. The private key is written to a private header at

5   block 88. The tamper-resistant product and the secure logfile viewer utility are built using the product's normal program preparation process. At block 90 the public.h and private.h header files are deleted, so that a build machine can no longer regenerate the secure logging that is now unique to this tamper-resistant software and logfile viewer build.

The operation of the logger initializer module 74 is illustrated in Fig. 4. At block 92 the

10   public key is rehashed and verified against the hash embedded in the logger software. This prevents the public key (if found in the tamper-resistant program file) from being substituted with a known public-key from an attacker's keypair. The log file is filled with random data at block 93. Then, a symmetric key is created at block 94 and is encrypted with the public-key and written to the secure logfile at block 95. The generation of log information of anomalous

15   activities, such as error messages or key indicators, occurs at block 96 and the log information is stored at block 97 using a printf()-like function to securely store the log information in the logfile The printf()-like api allows for the convenient interfacing of secure logging to the application programmers' code. In addition, an unhandled exception handler is registered to log the processor's state information (address of exception, registers, stack values, etc.) at the abnormal

20   termination of the tamper-resistant software. The routine printf()-like logging of normal program execution (as well as secure operations that are would never normally be traced), combined with abnormal termination exception handling, provide an accumulation of information useful for effective diagnosis of a program problem(s). At block 98, the logfile wrap is detected and

allowed to "wrap" the storage of log information from the bottom of the logfile to the top, effectively making the log file continuous and of a constant size.

The operation of the logger runtime module 76 is illustrated in Fig. 5. As shown in this Figure, the process includes a named mutex required to have been created before the secure

5   logfile is produced. The utility is shipped with the product and executed on directions by the product support personnel. The creation of a kernel object (like a named mutext) allows a stand-alone program such as the logger runtime module to signal our tamper-resistant software that it should change its default behavior (and begin secure logging). Although this actually produces a weakness in the tamper-resistance of the software, its convenience and obscurity prompted its

10   inclusion. Without such a switch, logging is always operational and its function could be detected and abused by an attacker. With knowledge of the switches existence, an attack may be able to locate the switch, activate its function, and have a more thorough knowledge of the secure logging done by the tamper-resistant software. As stated above, the program to create the mutext, and activate secure logging in the product, will only be revealed to an end-user by product

15   support after normal problem reporting does not make them suspect of tampering.

The operation of the logfile view module 78 is illustrated in Fig. 6. It is intended that such a file be retained at a central or trusted location and used by the product owner to debug or otherwise analyze the operation of the software within the secure processing environment. In this situation, the file is decrypted at block 112, the wrap location is determined at block 114 and

20   output is created in clear test at block 116.

Throughout this document, the reference to a secure processing environment has been made with the understanding that those skilled in the relevant art are aware of the techniques which are used to prevent observation and tampering with software operating in a secure processing environment. These techniques may vary from application to application, but are generally understood to be techniques that prevent or make it more difficult to watch the operation of the software, e.g., by using trace or debugging software. It is well known that such techniques also include other protections which are not disclosed in the interest of making the software more secure at resisting an attack but not providing a more detailed road-map of the protections which are provided and which must be circumvented in order to attack the software and its protection scheme.

Figs 7a, 7b and 7c are views of the logfile created at different times in accordance with the present invention. An initial logfile 180 is created at the beginning of operation with random data is shown in Fig. 7a. A series of n entries are created to fill the n spaces in the initial logfile 180 with random data R1, R2, R3, ... Rn-1, Rn.

In Fig. 7b, a log file 180' after two entries are prepared is shown. This logfile 180' is shown with data entries D1 and D2 and the remainder of the file remains filled with the random data R3 ... Rn-1, Rn which was shown in connection with Fig. 7a. The data added at each location is the encrypted data of the message to be logged. Once encrypted, this data appears as random bytes, indistinguishable from the surrounding bytes in the logfile.

The event logging continues using the logfile 180 (and 180') of the prior Fig. 7a and 7b until the event logging reaches the log of event n where the file is now full of data entries which

have been written over (replacing) the original random data entries. When event n+1 has been

recognized, the logging proceeds to wrap, or begin at the beginning of the logfile, overwriting a

new data entry Dn+1 over data entry D1. This process is shown in the Fig. 7C which is the result

of writing the data entry Dn+1 in the place of data entry D1 in Fig. 7b. Thus, the logfile 180" of

5   Fig. 7c includes data entries Dn+1, D2, D3, ... Dn-1, Dn in that order and data entry D1 (which

was the oldest entry in the logfile has disappeared and is lost. In this way, the logfile includes a

log of the n latest events after at least n event have been recognized, and all are in encrypted

form. In this way, it might be said that the data from the log file "wraps" around to fill from the

top when the file has been completely filled with data, making this a system in which the oldest

10   piece of log information is replaced by the newest piece. A block cipher is useful in allowing the

seamless encryption in place of data from a log message that has now wrapped within the file.

It may be a challenge to determine where the last event was recorded, in view of this

wrap function. In that case, there are several useful techniques that can be used to identify the

last written event. One way is to include a pointer either to the last event written (so that the

15   pointer then is incremented before writing the next event), or to the location Y in which the next

event will be written (where the last recorded event will be in location Y-1 unless Y is 1 where

the last location n in the logfile was the last one written.) Another approach is to include a

"dummy" entry of "next item" in the log file, where each entry is made in place of the "next

entry" item and then the "next entry" label is applied to the next location in the logfile.

20   By using the system shown in Fig. 7, the log file remains of a size for n entries, which

means that the logfile remains substantially the same size at all times (while, in its preferred

form. the log file would remain at the size established for it when the program was created, a file

which grows or shrinks slightly during operation, for example, by accommodating a fixed

number of messages of where the messages vary in size, remains within the spirit of the present invention). The logical length of the file is allowed to vary, and is only discernable when the logfile is securely decrypted. In this case, the physical logfile appears to be the size of n entries, even when it has no real entries (upon creation in Fig. 7a) or when it has two entries (in Fig. 7b)

5   or when n+1 entries have been created and the file includes the last n entries (in Fig. 7c). However, this would differ from a normal log file that starts at a small size before the logging starts and grows as the logging continues. Such a log file keeps growing larger as the logging continues, giving evidence of a new logged transaction (data being logged) by looking at the file before and after, whereas the system of the present invention does not show a change in size

10   whether a transaction has occurred and logging has happened or not.

Fig. 8 illustrates how the secure logging function of the present invention operates in one embodiment. A user U has his client computer 10 on which a secure processing environment is imposed through software such as a digital rights management system as described in connection with other parts of this document and particularly Fig. 1.

15   As shown in this Fig. 8, the user U detects a problem at step 200 which depicts actions of different entities, generally in accordance with the notations and formats of the Universal Modeling Language (UML) from the standards activity known as CORBA. The user then contacts (at step 210) his tech support personnel TS using his phone Pu to contact the phone Pts of the tech support operation, a facility which is often operated by or for the developer of the

20   software involved. At step 215, the tech support personnel TS instructs the user on how to invoke the secure logging function at the user's client computer 10. The steps the user undertakes are starting the secure logger at step 220, restart the tamper resistant software at step 225, log messages from the secure logger at step 230, wait for the problem to recur at block 235, then the

software terminates at block 240 (either through a failure or through a user action). The log file 180 is then sent at step 245 from the user's storage on the client computer 10 to the storage 52 of the computer 50 which is associated with tech support personnel TS. The tech support functions then decrypt the log file at block 250, do problem analysis at block 255 and report the results to

5   the user (either an identification of the problem, a resolution or that the problem could not be determined) at block 255.

Of course, many modifications of the present invention will be apparent to those skilled in the relevant art in view of the foregoing description of the preferred embodiment, taken together with the accompanying drawings. For example, the trace software may be activated in

10   any known manner, such as recognition of an error or in response to an operator determining that the data processing needs to be traced or even by a continuous recording of unusual events such as error messages, unintended software failures or indications of unusual activity, such as failures to perform a decryption step, an attempt to perform an proscribed activity such as attempting to copy material which is marked do not copy. Many other modifications can also be

15   made to the preferred embodiment without departing from the spirit of the present invention. For example, different ways of identifying where in the logfile the last entry was made have been indicated, although these are not exhaustive and other approaches might be used, if it is important to identify which was the last entry made (if that is important to know). Further, some of the features of the present invention can be used without the corresponding use of other

20   features. Additionally, some elements of the preferred embodiment disclosed herein may be performed in a different manner. For example, the key building process has been discussed in connection with use of public key encryption software from RSA which is useful in creating public/private key sets; however, there are other methods of creating similar encryption functions

using the public key approach, and other software techniques might be used in which some encryption other than public key might be used to advantage. Accordingly, the foregoing description of the preferred embodiment should be considered as merely illustrative of the principles of the present invention and not in limitation thereof.

5   Further, the present invention has been described in the context of a method and system for accomplishing the secure logging and allowing the analysis. The present invention might be considered as software which includes sets of programming to accomplish these functions or even as a service which provided the analysis of code which has been generated using the techniques described in the foregoing description and illustrated in the accompanying drawings.

10   The present invention has also been described in the context of a software program to provide the functions indicated, functions which are well known to those skilled in the art. These functions may be provided in the form of software in any convenient programming language, the selection of which is not particularly relevant to the present invention. One or more aspects of the present invention could be implemented in hardware, if desired, or in some combination of hardware and

15   software, if desired. The present invention has also described the process of transmitting information from a user's system to a central debug facility, a function which has not been described in detail because the present invention is not particularly dependent on the type of communication which is employed to achieve this function. Thus, the file could be transmitted alone or in combination with other material (to further obscure the location and function of the

20   log file) and the transmission could be achieved through sending a file over a network connection, sending a physical media such as a diskette or CD with the relevant information stored on it, or by printing the file and sending paper which may be input through OCR scanning. In addition, the information from the file could be determined using a concurrent

session, if desired. The generation of a log file has also been described in connection with turning it on through a switch-like function in code. This turning on function may be accomplished under operator control, under remote control (from a message from a help desk) or even under program control, as desired, or it may be constantly on and logging events. The

5   function of transmitting the log file, similarly, can be accomplished in response to a user's command, a remote command or a program command, as, for example, when a program abnormally ends or crashes. Given concerns about privacy and security of information, such as protected content, it is believed that it will be desirable in many situations to use a user-initiated logging command and a user-initiated sending of a log file, but these are really design choices

10 and not requirements of the present invention.